Re-examining Capital Structure of State and Non-State Owned Enterprises in selected G-20 Countries: Developed Markets vs Emerging Markets


  • Muhammad Yusuf Amin Institute of Business Studies and Leadership, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan
  • Faisal Sher Institute of Business Studies and Leadership, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan
  • Sami ur Rahman Institute of Business Studies and Leadership, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan


Capital structure , Ordinary least square, State-owned enterprises, Emerging economies


Purpose: In this article we explore how decisions on capital structure of enterprises are affected by ownership in selected G20 countries. This effect is also investigated across the level of economic development in selected countries.

Design and Methodology: Data on SOE and non-SOEs in these countries were selected from 2011 to 2015.This study employs ordinary least square and random effect methods, to investigate the effect of ownership on capital structure decisions in selected G20 countries and across the level economic development.

Findings: We determine that decisions on capital structure of an enterprise are effected significantly by its ownership structure and level of economic development. We find that in developed economies, state-owned enterprises are highly levered than non-state-owned peers, while the opposite is true in emerging economies. When the interaction between ownership structure and level of development is considered, state-owned enterprises in emerging economies have less leverage than their counterparts in developed countries.

Implications: We believe that our findings will benefit corporate management, financial regulators, and financial researchers. Furthermore, the capital structure decisions of SOEs and non-SOEs require investigation at different industrial levels, specifically in emerging markets.


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How to Cite

Muhammad Yusuf Amin, Faisal Sher, & Sami ur Rahman. (2022). Re-examining Capital Structure of State and Non-State Owned Enterprises in selected G-20 Countries: Developed Markets vs Emerging Markets. UW Journal of Management Sciences, 6(1), 34–48. Retrieved from